





















The main purpose of this article is to 
answer the following question: is it pos-
sible to combine the advantages of both 
proportional and pluralitarian electoral 
laws? The same question can also be for-
mulated in another way: does the mixed-
-member electoral system allow “nations 
to tailor their electoral systems so as to 
potentially have their cake and eat it too” 
(Shugart and Wattenberg, 2005: 10)?
The next section defines the two 
main electoral systems: proportional and 
pluralitarian, and explains the main ad-
vantages of the two systems. The third 
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TO EAT A CAKE AND TO HAVE
A THREE-QUARTER OF IT:
IS IT POSSIBLE TO HAVE 
THE BEST OF BOTH WORLDS
OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS?
Summary  The article investigates whether it is possible to combine the advantages of 
two groups of electoral systems – PR and pluralitarian (or majoritarian) – or not. It ana-
lyzes the existing mixed electoral systems and suggests possible improvements thereof. 
The main conclusion is that it is not possible to eliminate all disadvantages of PR and plu-
ralitarian electoral systems, but it is possible, at least theoretically, to eliminate most of 
them by combining attributes of both worlds of electoral systems. In short, the electoral 
system proposed in this article would make it possible to “eat the entire cake and have a 
three-quarter of it”.
























ed-member electoral system and com-
pares it with pluralitarian and PR sys-
tems. This section also explains the main 
variances of mixed electoral systems. The 
fourth section analyzes one of the two 
variances of the mixed-member electoral 
system: the mixed-member proportion-
al (MMP) system, on the basis of inves-
tigation of the German electoral system. 
The fifth section examines, theoretically, 
possible improvements of MMP elector-
al system. In the section that follows, an 
electoral system is proposed. Finally, in 
section seven, advantages and disadvan-
tages of the proposed electoral system 
are analyzed. 
2. Proportional Electoral Law Versus 
Plurality Electoral Law
Electoral systems are usually clas-
sified into two groups – plurality sys-
tems and proportional electoral systems 
(PR). However, there are no universal-
ly accepted definitions of the two sys-
tems in political science. According to 
Dieter Nohlen (1990: 79), the plurality 
electoral system is traditionally defined 
as a system in which the elected candi-
date must win the plurality or majority 
of votes, whereas in the PR system, the 
distribution of seats tends to mirror the 
distribution of votes for parties. Simi-
larly, according to Shugart and Watten-
berg (2005: 9), pluralitarian (majorita-
rian) systems 
usually employ exclusive single-seat 
districts with plurality rule (or some-
times a two-round majority formu-
la) and tend to give greater represen-
tation to the two parties that receive 
the most votes. Proportional systems 
must employ multi-seat districts, 
usually with party lists, and typically 
produce parliamentary representati-
on that largely mirrors the vote sha-
res of multiple parties.
Arend Lijphart (1999: 143) defines 
the plurality method of elections as a 
“winner-take-all method (the candidate 
supported by the largest number of votes 
wins, and all other voters remain unre-
presented)... In sharp contrast, the basic 
aim of proportional representation is to 
represent both majorities and minorities 
and... to translate votes into seats pro-
portionality.” Ferrer and Russo (1984) 
define the pluralitarian electoral sys-
tem as a system in which only one re-
presentative is elected from one electoral 
district. In contrast, in the proportion-
al electoral system more than one re-
presentative is elected from one electoral 
district. Nohlen (1990) criticizes Ferrer 
and Russo’s definition by arguing that 
the pluralitarian electoral system allows 
the election of more than one person in 
an electoral district. For example, in the 
United Kingdom, several electoral dis-
tricts elected more than one represen-
tative to the Parliament up until 1948. 
However, nobody argues that the elec-
toral system in the UK was not plurali-
tarian prior to this year.
From the analysis above it is obvious 
that all the most important definitions 
of plurality and PR electoral systems are 
very similar. They differ only in nuan-
ces. However, probably the most pre-
cise definition of the two electoral sys-
tems is given by Nohlen (1990: 83). He 
defines the two electoral systems in the 
following way: “In the pluralitarian elec-
toral system, a candidate(s) or a party – 
in order to be elected – must get the plu-
rality or majority of votes in an electoral 
district... In the proportional elector-
al system, the distribution of mandates 
depends on the percentage of votes re-





















in electoral districts.” Therefore, this ar-
ticle accepts Nohlen’s definition of elec-
toral systems.
Proponents of plurality law (for ex-
ample, Maurice Duverger (1954) and 
Ferdinand Hermens (1972)) cite its fol-
lowing advantages. Firstly, plurality law 
creates a stable, usually one-party go-
vernment. Secondly, plurality electoral 
law creates clear responsibility for the 
policies, and enables people to choose 
a government. Thirdly, plurality law en-
ables close and clear contact between 
members of the parliament and their 
constituencies. Furthermore, it produ-
ces a simple voting method. In addition, 
plurality law neutralizes the dispropor-
tionately strong influence of small par-
ties. Finally, under plurality law, extreme 
parties have much less of a chance to be 
represented in the parliament.
According to the well-known Du-
verger’s law (1954), plurality electoral 
law tends to produce a two-party sys-
tem, while proportional law (PR) tends 
to produce a multiparty system. Some 
authors (Sartori, 1986; Nohlen, 1990) 
have challenged Duverger’s law. Howev-
er, empirical evidence shows that, in the 
long run, plurality law causes overrepre-
sentation of the two strongest parties at 
the national level. According to Lijphart 
(1999: 13), on the basis of pluralitarian 
electoral law, 
the bulk of the seats are captured by 
the two major parties, and they form 
the cabinets: the Labour party from 
1945 to 1951, 1964 to 1970, 1974 
to 1979, and from 1979 on, and the 
Conservatives from 1951 to 1964, 
1970 to 1974, and in the long stretch 
from 1979 to 1997. The hegemony of 
these two parties was especially pro-
nounced between 1950 and 1970: 
jointly they never won less than 87.5 
percent of votes and 98 percent of 
the seats in the House of Commons 
in the seven elections held in this pe-
riod. 
Overrepresentation of the strong-
est party and a small number of parties 
create a stable government in countries 
with plurality electoral law. Frequently, 
one party has an absolute majority in the 
parliament. Accordingly, this party may 
form a stable government because the 
parliamentary majority has an interest 
in supporting its own government. For 
example, in the United Kingdom, gener-
al elections have failed to produce an ab-
solute majority of one party only twice 
since 1945 (Steiner, 1991: 109). There-
fore, a one-party government is almost 
an inevitable consequence of plurali-
ty electoral law. Paul Brass (1977: 1388) 
found that “one-party governments 
were more stable than coalition govern-
ments, that majority governments were 
more stable than minority governments, 
and that government stability correlat-
ed negatively both with the number of 
parties in the cabinet and governmen-
tal fragmentation”. Stability is not only a 
goal in and of itself, but it may also pro-
duce higher GDP per capita growth. Ac-
cording to Haggard and Kaufman (1995: 
356), “two-party systems appear to have 
had a good long term record in main-
taining stable macro-economic poli-
cies”.
PR may produce instability in go-
vernment. The failure of the Weimar Re-
public is almost a cliché in the literature. 
However, many modern countries have 
also experienced government instabi-
lity. For example, Italy – because of PR 
– has had over 50 cabinets since World 
War II (Osiatynski 1999: 10). In Poland, 
31 parties won seats in the October 1991 
























ty won only 13.5 percent of the seats 
(Lijphart, 1992: 210). It is extremely dif-
ficult to form a governing coalition with 
such a strong dispersion of parliamen-
tary seats. The situation is even worse 
if a strong party is considered to be an 
anti-system party. For example, in Ita-
ly, the communist party never entered 
into a governing coalition even though 
it was the second largest political party 
for a long period of time. The govern-
ment coalition in Italy very often con-
sisted of five or more parties with a very 
weak majority in the parliament. France, 
which also had PR systems, faced similar 
problems in the 3th and 4th Republics (as 
well as in 1986). 
One-party government (which is 
usually a product of plurality law) has 
an additional advantage. It enables clear 
responsibility in politics. The govern-
ing party is responsible for political suc-
cess and failure. As a result, the electoral 
process is essentially a referendum on the 
incumbent. If people are satisfied, they 
may vote not only for the same govern-
ment, but also, indirectly, for the same 
politics. Moreover, plurality electoral law 
de facto enables voting on the govern-
ment as a whole. In contrast, if a coun-
try has a multiparty government, it is not 
clear which party is responsible. In addi-
tion, people usually do not have the op-
portunity to decide on the government 
under a PR system, because typically, no 
party receives an absolute majority in 
the parliament. The governing coalition 
is a result of bargaining among parties. 
Many times, one party receives much 
fewer votes than in the previous election. 
Despite this, the party continues to run 
the country, changing only portfolios, as 
a member of the governing coalition. 
Plurality law allows for the election 
of people, not only parties. Each candi-
date represents not only a party, but also 
his/her constituency. Equally important, 
people know who represents them in the 
parliament. In other words, plurality law 
enables a strong connection between 
members of the parliament and their 
constituencies. The majority of countries 
with PR have a system with a closed list 
of candidates. Thus, people elect parties 
and not candidates. The party bureau-
cracy decides the position of candidates 
on the list. People who have a high posi-
tion on the list have a very good chance 
of being elected, while people who are 
low on the list have almost no chance of 
being elected to the parliament. Conse-
quently, party bureaucracies actually de-
cide in advance on the majority of the 
members of the parliament. 
PR sometimes allows a small par-
ty to have a significant influence in the 
government because it is not possible to 
form a coalition government without the 
support of the small party. “In Germa-
ny, the party with the most government 
experience is the smallest of the three 
main parties, the Free Democrats. This 
party has been in coalition with one or 
the other of the two largest parties, the 
Social Democrats and Christian Demo-
crats, for twenty-seven out of thirty-four 
years in the period 1950-1983” (Taylor, 
1984: 58).
As was noted earlier, political scien-
tists agree that a government formed by 
only one party is the most stable form of 
democratic government. Since this type 
of government is usually a result of plu-
rality electoral law, it follows that PR sys-
tems produce a less stable government. 
However, a more stable government 
is not necessarily a more efficient one. 
Efficiency can be measured according 
to economic and political criteria. The 





















economic growth, inflation, unemploy-
ment, and distribution of income. Con-
sequently, economic results show the ef-
ficiency of a government. Lijphart’s data 
(1991: 78) indicate that countries with 
a parliamentary system and PR (these 
countries usually have coalition govern-
ments) had an average economic growth 
rate of 3.5 percent per year in the 1961-
-1988 period. The same figure is 3.4 per-
cent for countries with a parliamentary 
system and plurality law (these countries 
usually have a one-party government). 
PR countries had a lower inflation 
than countries with plurality law (6.3 
percent / 7.5 percent), and a lower rate 
of unemployment (4.4 percent / 6.1 per-
cent). In addition, economic equality 
is higher in countries with PR, because 
20 percent of the richest people earn 39 
percent of the income, while in countries 
with plurality law the richest people earn 
42.9 percent. Countries with a presiden-
tial system and a plurality electoral law 
had economic growth of 3.3 percent per 
year, inflation of 5.1 percent per year, 
unemployment of 6.1 percent per year, 
and the richest 20 percent of the popula-
tion earned 39.9 percent of the national 
income. Even though the differences are 
not very large, it is clear that countries 
with coalition governments (mainly 
countries with PR) have more efficient 
economies. 
The data discussed above raise the 
question: how is it possible that less sta-
ble governments are more efficient? One 
of the possible explanations is that PR 
provides better control of government. If 
one party has an absolute majority in the 
parliament, it is much more difficult to 
control the government. Since party dis-
cipline is very strong in the parliamen-
tary system, parliament members rare-
ly dismiss the government controlled by 
their own party. “In the first place, the 
political strength of the British Prime 
Minister comes, today, from his position 
as head of a disciplined majority party, 
and from the appointive powers that his 
office gives him” (Needler, 1962: 382). 
Consequently, a one-party government 
can usually be changed only with a new 
election. Frequently, a majoritarian go-
vernment is stable even if its policies are 
inefficient. In contrast, inefficient poli-
cies may lead to resignation of a coali-
tion government. If a party considers 
actual policies as harmful, it will most 
likely leave the coalition government in 
order to enhance its chances in the next 
election.
In a majoritarian system, the real 
decision-maker is the prime minister. 
According to Steiner (1991: 115), “the 
Prime Minister can define the consen-
sus as being what he thinks fit. Even 
though a majority of the opinions ex-
pressed were against him, that would 
not necessarily prevent him deciding 
as he wishes.” In such a system, minis-
ters are more like executors than deci-
sion-makers. In contrast, in a coalition 
government, the prime minister must 
respect the opinions of all ministers, es-
pecially the opinions of ministers from 
other parties in the coalition. Otherwise, 
other parties will leave the coalition and 
the government will lose its majority in 
the parliament. In a coalition govern-
ment, the prime minister is controlled 
not only by the parliament, but also by 
his/her own ministers in the cabinet. 
If political policies are inefficient, it is 
much easier to change a coalition gov-
ernment than a majoritarian one. There-
fore, even though coalition governments 
are less stable, they are not necessari-
ly less efficient. After World War II, the 
























stable governments among the western 
democracies, while Italy had one of the 
most unstable governments. However, 
since 1945, Italy’s growth rate has been 
much higher than Britain’s, even though 
Britain discovered oil in its territory 
(Lijphart, 1991: 80). Obviously, the in-
stability of the government did not pro-
duce a lower level of efficiency.
Some additional facts may also help 
explain the success of coalition govern-
ments. Majoritarian governments repre-
sent the majority in the parliament. 
However, they do not necessarily repre-
sent the majority of the voters, because 
plurality electoral law can produce an ar-
tificial majority in the parliament. Often, 
a party with less than 40 percent of the 
votes has an absolute majority in the par-
liament. In addition, real support for the 
governing party is lower than the per-
centage of votes. Many voters vote strate-
gically, knowing that only the two strong-
est parties have a real chance of winning 
in a constituency. An artificial majority 
in the parliament produces legality, but 
not legitimacy for a policy. Since the PR 
system produces fair representation in 
the parliament, a coalition government 
represents not only the majority in the 
parliament, but also the majority of the 
people. (Of course, this statement is not 
valid for minority governments.) In oth-
er words, a coalition government has le-
gality and legitimacy. In order to enhance 
support among voters, coalition govern-
ments sometimes have even more parties 
in the coalition than is necessary for ma-
jority support in the parliament. Accord-
ing to Laver and Schofield (1991: 69), 
“larger coalitions, all other things being 
equal, may possibly have more legitima-
cy and authority than smaller ones”.
Coalition governments are politi-
cally less stable, but they have more sta-
ble policies. Frequently, a new coalition 
has some parties and ministers from the 
previous government. This fact enables 
a certain degree of continuity in poli-
cies. On the contrary, if a party loses 
an election in a majoritarian system, a 
new one-party government will replace 
all ministers from the previous govern-
ment. Finally, plurality electoral law 
sometimes produces an abrupt change 
of government and policies. 
To take a concrete instance, post-
war Labour governments in Britain 
have nationalized certain industries, 
some of which subsequent Conser-
vative governments have denationa-
lized; Labour proclaims its intention, 
when it regains power, of renationa-
lizing these without compensation. 
This has led worried industrialists to 
seek a remedy for such repeated re-
versals, which make it impossible for 
them to plan ahead beyond the next 
election (Lakeman, 1984: 48).
From the above analysis, it is obvious 
that both electoral systems have, theo-
retically, advantages and disadvantages. 
Lijphart (1984: 208) summarizes these 
advantages in the following way:
The main advantage the plurali-
ty advocates cite for their system is 
that it encourages a two-party sys-
tem – which, in turn, makes stable 
one-party governments in parlia-
mentary regimes possible... The se-
condary advantages of plurality are 
its great simplicity, the fact that it al-
lows a vote for individual candidates 
instead of party lists... and that it per-
mits close contact between each re-
presentative and his or her constit-
uents... The overriding advantage 
that PR partisans see in PR is that it 
yields more or less proportional re-





















and of itself, but it is also considered 
to be especially important because it 
allows minority representation. 
Of course, one may challenge Lijp-
hart’s above-mentioned arguments. For 
example, is stability of government good 
or bad? The previous analysis in this 
section has shown that more stable go-
vernments are not necessarily more ef-
ficient. Furthermore, Antić (2010: 134) 
has shown that communist countries 
have had the most stable governments 
and they, certainly, cannot be conside-
red as democratic role models. However, 
in spite of the fact that stability and effi-
ciency of a system are not directly cor-
related, there is no doubt that extreme 
instability of a political system (which 
might be a consequence of a pure PR 
electoral system) may contribute not 
only to inefficiency, but also to a collapse 
of democracy as such. According to Su-
san Scarrow (2005: 58-59), 
during the Weimar years Germany 
used a very pure form of proportion-
al representation to elect the lower 
house of its national parliament... 
Although these very open rules did 
not create Weimar’s fragmented par-
ty system... they certainly helped to 
sustain partisan divisions, since they 
offered almost no incentives for par-
ties to cooperate or conglomerate 
in order to win elections. This frag-
mentation made it hard for parties 
to build and sustain governing coali-
tions. Contemporary as well as later 
observers concluded that this hyper 
representative electoral system itself 
bore significant responsibility for 
undermining Weimar democracy.1
1 See pages 75, 76 and 85-86 in this article.
It is also logical to ask whether fair 
representation of minorities is good or 
bad. The above quotation shows that in-
clusion of representatives of all minori-
ties could be harmful for the functioning 
of democracy. However, the opposite is 
also true: exclusion of minorities could 
undermine the legitimacy of the par-
liament because it does not reflect pre-
ferences of voters. It is obvious that 
the main question is whether elections 
should enable stable, one-party govern-
ment, or representation of all main in-
terest groups in a society. According 
to the functional theory of democracy, 
the main function of elections is to en-
able a stable government. Consequent-
ly, the functional theory prefers plurality 
electoral law. In contrast, the participa-
tive theory of democracy argues that 
the function of elections is to enable fair 
representation in a parliament. There-
fore, this theory prefers the PR system.2 
However, no matter what is considered 
as a more important value, it is certain 
that fairness in the distribution of man-
dates is a value in and by itself because it 
increases the legitimacy of a parliament. 
In other words, fairness (which is easier 
to achieve in a PR system) is a positive 
element of a political system (though it 
is questionable whether this particular 
quality is more important than others). 
Furthermore, representation of minori-
ties in the parliament, especially ethnic 
minorities, enables better protection of 
their rights. According to Lijphart (1991: 
81), “divided societies... need peaceful 
coexistence among contending ethnic 
groups. This requires conciliation and 
2 For a discussion about the relationship be-
tween political theories and electoral sys-
tems, see Kasapović, 1991 (especially page 
























compromise, goals that in turn require 
the greatest possible inclusion repre-
sentative of these groups in the decision-
making process. Such power sharing can 
be arranged more easily in... PR systems 
than in... plurality systems.” 
To conclude, stability and fair re-
presentation of minorities are good for 
a system. However, these two values are 
frequently in conflict because fair repre-
sentation of all minorities may under-
mine the stability of a political system. 
3. Mixed Electoral Systems
Since both electoral systems (plura-
litarian and proportional) have advan-
tages and disadvantages, it is logical that 
many countries tried to combine their 
elements, minimizing the negative con-
sequences of the two systems and taking 
the main advantages of them.3 As a re-
sult, they established the mixed-member 
system. According to Shugart and Wat-
tenberg (2005: xxi), “in the view of many 
electoral reformers, the mixed-member 
system offers the best of both worlds – 
the direct accountability of members to 
the districts in which they are elected, 
and the diverse partisan preferences”. In 
other words, the mixed-member elector-
al system was supposed to enable “eating 
a cake and having it”. So, is it possible to 
take the advantages of both worlds? Be-
fore answering this question, it is neces-
3 Of course, in reality, mixed-member elec-
toral systems usually emerged as a compro-
mise between parties that wanted pluralita-
rian electoral law and those that wanted PR. 
However, it is out of the scope of this paper 
to analyze the origins of these systems. For 
a comprehensive analysis of the origins of 
mixed-member electoral systems, see Shu-
gart and Wattenberg (eds), 2005: 55-278. 
sary to define the mixed-member elec-
toral system and to classify it. 
There are three main definitions of 
mixed electoral systems. Blais and Mas-
sicote (1996) define mixed electoral sys-
tems in terms of inputs: a system where 
plurality/majority and PR are used si-
multaneously in a single election and 
where at least 5% of the total mem-
bers are elected under a different sys-
tem. Giovanni Sartori (2000) focuses 
on the output: a mixed system provides 
a plurality-proportional mix and must 
not be fully proportional. According to 
Blais and Massicote’s definition, Israeli 
elections in 1996 and 1999 – when the 
prime minister was directly elected, on 
the basis of majoritarian electoral law, 
and members of the parliament were 
elected on the basis of PR electoral law 
– were not based on mixed electoral law. 
On the basis of Sartori’s definition, Ger-
many does not have mixed electoral law 
because electoral results in this coun-
try are almost fully proportional.4 Since 
these two classifications are too restric-
tive, this article uses Shugart and Wat-
tenberg’s (2005: 10) definition: “Mixed-
-member systems are thus a variant of 
such multiple-tier systems with the spe-
cific proviso that one tier must entail al-
location of seats nominally whereas the 
other must entail allocation of seats by 
lists.” This article also follows the au-
thors’ classification of mixed electoral 
systems in two groups: 
We identify two broad subtypes, 
which we call mixed-member majori-
tarian (MMM) and mixed-member 
proportional (MMP)... The primary 
variable in mixed-member systems 
4 Interestingly, Lijphart (1984: 207) also does 
not classify the electoral system of Germany 





















that separates MMM and MMP sys-
tems is the presence or absence of 
linkage between tiers. If the tiers are 
not linked, then the typical majori-
tarian boost received by a large party 
in the nominal tier is not likely to be 
wiped away by proportional alloca-
tion from the list tier. Thus, the prin-
ciple behind majoritarian systems – 
giving an advantage to a large party 
– remains in the MMM system. On 
the other hand, MMP systems prio-
ritize the list-PR tier, such that large 
parties do not receive a boost in over-
all seat allocation, or receive a small-
er one than they would in an other-
wise similar MMM system (Shugart 
and Wattenberg, 2005: 13). 
It is out of the scope of this article to 
analyze all existing mixed-member elec-
toral systems.5 Therefore, an overall as-
sessment will be made. Since the main 
purpose of this article is to find out 
whether it is possible to have “the best 
of both worlds”, it will be analyzed first 
whether MMM electoral systems enable 
both fairness in the distribution of man-
dates and direct accountability of mem-
bers to the districts in which they are 
elected. From the experience of coun-
tries that have had MMM electoral sys-
tems, the following conclusion can be 
made: an MMM system indeed increa-
ses fairness in distribution of mandates 
in comparison with a pure pluralitarian 
system and enables more accountabili-
ty of members of parliaments (MP) to 
the districts in comparison to a pure PR 
electoral system. However, the opposite 
is also true: an MMM system produces 
5 For an overview of existing mixed electoral 
systems, see Massicote and Blais, 1999. See 
also analyses on country by country bases in 
Shugart and Wattenberg, 2005. 
less fairness in the distribution of man-
dates than a pure PR system and less ac-
countability of MPs to the districts than 
a pure pluralitarian electoral system. 
In other words, MMM enables eating 
half of a cake. However, the direct con-
sequence is that one does not have the 
other half of the cake. According to Sar-
tori (1975: 75), while MMM advocates 
may believe “that they are bringing to-
gether the best of two worlds”, they are, 
in fact, more likely to obtain “a bastard-
-producing hybrid which combines [the] 
defects” of PR and pluralitarian elector-
al systems. So, if the MMM system does 
not offer the best of both worlds, does 
the MMP system offer that? In order to 
answer that question, the next section 
analyzes the German electoral system, 
which has been a model for all other 
MMP electoral systems.
4. Electoral System of Germany 
(West) Germany was the first coun-
try to choose the MMP electoral system. 
This electoral system was chosen as a re-
sult of bargaining between main political 
parties, but also as a result of prevalent 
will among the establishment for a sta-
ble but also democratic political system.6 
The MMP system has been used in Ger-
many since 1949. Since then, the elec-
toral system was slightly changed seve-
ral times, but the main characteristics 
of this system have remained the same 
for 62 years. According to the electoral 
law, half of representatives are elected 
in single-member districts (SMD), and 
the other half from the party lists. Vo-
ters have two votes: one for the district, 
6 Scarrow (2005) explains how the German 
electoral system was adopted. Consequences 
of the German electoral system are examined 
























and another for lists. However, in con-
trast to the MMM system, the overall 
number of seats for one party depends 
on the percentage of votes on the se-
cond ballot (party lists). In other words, 
one party gets approximately equal per-
centage of seats as percentage of votes 
(parties with less than 5 percent of votes 
or less than three SMD winners are ex-
cluded). If the number of seats won in 
SMD is lower than the number of seats 
one party should get as a result of the 
second vote, additional MPs are elect-
ed from closed party lists (parties decide 
about positions on the lists). However, if 
the number of SMD won by a party is 
higher than the number of seats allocat-
ed by the party’s proportion of list votes, 
the party may keep the additional seats. 
In SMD it is enough to get the plurality 
of votes. 
So, what are the consequences of the 
MMP electoral system? Does this elector-
al system enable the best of both worlds? 
The first thing that should be noted is 
that the MMP system has the main at-
tribute of PR systems – fairness in the 
distribution of mandates. One party gets 
approximately the same percentage of 
seats and votes.7 Actually, the main ob-
stacle for full proportionality in the dis-
tribution of votes and seats are not SMD, 
but the 5% threshold (as in PR elector-
al systems). In other words, MMP ena-
bles the eating of a cake. However, does 
it allow also having a cake? Or, does the 
MMP system have attributes of plurality 
electoral law? One of the attributes of the 
plurality system is accountability of MPs 
to districts, and in the German elector-
7 This is the main reason why Lijphart consid-
ers the electoral system of Germany as a vari-
ant of the PR system (see Lijphart, 1984 and 
Lijphart, 1999).
al system, half of representatives (elect-
ed in SMD) are accountable to the elec-
torate in districts. Hence, voters choose 
half of their representatives on their own 
and party bureaucrats decide – forming 
party lists – only about half of represent-
atives. This means that the MMP system 
enables better personalization of politics 
than the classical PR system and, thus, 
more accountability of MPs than the PR 
system. Consequently, the MMP system 
– keeping almost all advantages of the 
PR system – allows some advantages of 
the plurality system.
However, it is also obvious that Ger-
many’s MMP system does not allow all 
the advantages of the plurality system. 
It does not allow people to elect their 
prime minister,8 and the formation of 
government is a consequence of inter-
party bargaining. Furthermore, half of 
representatives are not accountable to 
their districts. The voting method is 
more complicated than in plurality elec-
toral law and enables strategic voting.9 
Finally, as mentioned earlier, German 
electoral law does not allow full propor-
tionality – because of the threshold and 
extra seats in SMD – between percent-
age of votes and percentage of seats.
8 In countries with plurality electoral law, peo-
ple also do not elect the prime minister di-
rectly but, since one party usually has an 
overall majority, people know that by voting 
for one party they also vote for the leader of 
this party to become the prime minister.
9 Strategic voting means that voters may split 
their votes and vote for one party in SMD 
and for another with the second ballot. Since 
a party may keep extra seats won in SMD, 
strategic voting may produce a better result 
for a coalition of parties than voting for the 





















Nevertheless, experience with Ger-
man electoral law shows that it is possi-
ble to have some advantages of one elec-
toral system without eliminating all the 
advantages of another. Germany has a 
fair distribution of seats, having at the 
same time direct accountability of half 
of their MPs to their districts. In oth-
er words, the German electoral system 
shows that it is possible to eat a cake and 
still have at least a part of it. Neverthe-
less, is it possible to have a bigger part of 
the cake than German electoral law ena-
bles? In other words, is it possible to fur-
ther improve the MMP system in order 
to have more advantages of both worlds? 
This issue will be analyzed in the next 
section. 
5. Is It Possible to Improve 
the MMP Electoral System?
The previous section has shown that 
German electoral law enables persona-
lization of elections. Half of representa-
tives are elected from SMD. However, is 
it possible to have an electoral system in 
which voters decide also about the oth-
er half of representatives? The German 
system has a closed list and voters can-
not decide about the position of candi-
dates on the list. This means that can-
didates who are low on the list do not 
have much chance to be elected, while 
those who are high on the list have se-
cured membership in the parliament 
prior to the elections (if the party pas-
ses the threshold). However, some var-
iances of the MMP system enable vo-
ters to decide also about candidates on 
the list. The most logical solution is that 
the position on the list depends on the 
number of votes a candidate receives in 
SMD. This means that the “best losers” 
in SMD (since winners in SMD are di-
rectly elected) are also elected in the par-
liament. And these “best losers” assure 
proportional distribution of seats in the 
parliament. According to Shugart and 
Wattenberg (2005: 12-13),
There is no reason why a mixed-
-member system could not employ 
open lists in the list tier... Mixed-
-member systems lend themselves 
to lists ordered on the basis of which 
candidates prove to be the “best lo-
sers” in the nominal-tier districts 
in which they are nominated. Vari-
ations on the best-loser provision 
have been used in Mexico (1964-
-76), as well as by the Italian senate 
since 1993 and Japan’s lower house 
since 1996... Best-loser lists do pro-
vide candidates with the incentive 
to be popular within their districts – 
even in districts that are “hopeless” 
for their party to win in the nominal 
tier – because more popular candi-
dates will be elected from the list tier 
ahead of less popular copartisans. 
In a system that employs a best-lo-
ser provision on the list tier, there is 
no list, per se. Rather, parties simply 
nominate candidates in the nominal 
tier. Once nominal-tier winning can-
didates have been determined, any 
seats that a party may obtain from 
the list are taken from its pool of 
nominated candidates who did not 
win their races. Thus, under this sys-
tem, the nominal-tier districts serve 
as de facto nominating districts for 
the list tier. 
There are three possible criteria for 
deciding who the “best losers” are. The 
first criteria is the percentage of votes, 
the second is the difference in number 
(or percentage) of votes between winner 
and loser. However, probably the best 
solution is the overall number of votes. 
























voting turnout, because districts with 
a higher turnout would have a better 
chance of being represented with more 
than one representative.
One of the possible disadvantages of 
the MMP system is, as mentioned ear-
lier, strategic voting: voters split their 
votes in order to increase, artificially, 
the number of seats for a coalition of 
parties they support.10 An easy solution 
against strategic voting is one vote in-
stead of two. This vote decides who wins 
in SMD, but also the overall number 
of votes for a party or coalition. Sim-
ply, votes for all candidates, in all SMD, 
can be summed up in order to check the 
overall number and percentage of votes 
for a party or coalition on the nation-
al level.11 Such a system eliminates the 
possibility of strategic voting and pos-
sible manipulation with such a voting. 
If a voter has only one vote, he/she can-
not split votes in order to have addition-
al seats in the nominal tier. With such a 
solution, simplicity of voting in the plu-
rality electoral system can be combined 
with the fairness of the PR electoral sys-
tem. Furthermore, each party would be 
motivated to run with the most popu-
lar candidate because they run not only 
for themselves but also for the party as a 
whole. In addition, voters would be able 
to vote for individuals as in the classical 
plurality electoral system. Consequently, 
10 According to Klingemann and Wessels (2005: 
287), approximately 20% of voters are ticket-
-splitters, and this splitting is now predomi-
nately in favor of Christian Democrats (see 
Farell, 2001: 111).
11 Italy uses such an electoral system for elec-
tion of Senate (see Katz, 2005: 115). Germa-
ny also utilized the MMP electoral system in 
which voters had only one vote in the 1949 
elections (see Scarrow, 2005).
voters would be able to eliminate party 
candidates that are not popular among 
voters, which is not the case with PR sys-
tems with a closed list, where the posi-
tion on the list and chances for getting 
seats in the parliament are decided by 
party bureaucrats.
The MMP system may also solve an 
additional problem with the PR system 
– overrepresentation of cities. According 
to Farell (2001: 80), “there is a danger 
the geographical location of MP... may 
be concentrated in the urban, more po-
pulated areas, leaving whole swathes of 
the population ‘unrepresented’”. Howev-
er, the MMP system with SMD prevents 
such a problem, because all regions are 
represented in the parliament. 
To summarize, an appropriate MMP 
electoral system may enable both: a fair 
distribution of seats and a clear contact 
between members of the parliament and 
their constituencies. In other words, the 
MMP system enables fully personalized 
proportional representation. To return 
to the mantra of this article, it enables 
eating a cake and still having half of it.
But, what about the other half? Is it 
possible to have some additional advan-
tages of plurality electoral law, but on 
the basis of a fair (proportional) distri-
bution of mandates? It has been men-
tioned above that plurality electoral law 
usually enables people to choose the 
government. In contrast, in PR systems, 
the governing coalition is a result of bar-
gaining among parties. So, is it possible 
to allow people to elect the head of the 
government having, at the same time, a 
proportional distribution of seats in the 
parliament? The answer to this question 
is positive. Israel had, from 1992-1999, 
an electoral system which was almost 
fully proportional (the legal thresh-





















try was one constituency), having at the 
same time direct elections for prime 
minister.12 Such a system was a variance 
of MMP because it combined a nomi-
nal and a list tier in the elections, and it 
enabled, obviously, even more direct in-
fluence of voters on the head of govern-
ment than plurality electoral law.13 How-
ever, Israel had a system with a closed 
party list. This means that, under the 
law that existed from 1992-1999, voters 
had an opportunity to vote personally 
only on the prime minister, without hav-
ing influence on candidates on the list 
for the parliament. However, it is obvi-
ous that a personalized electoral system 
for the parliament (the above-described 
MMP system) can be combined with di-
rect election of the prime minister. 
The above analyses have shown that 
it is possible to combine the main advan-
tage of PR – fairness in distribution of 
seats – with almost all advantages of plu-
rality electoral law: connection between 
people and MPs, simple voting method, 
elimination of strategic voting, and even 
direct election of prime minister. Never-
theless, is it possible to eliminate the last 
two advantages of plurality electoral law: 
neutralization of small parties and a sta-
ble one-party government? Before these 
questions are answered, it should be no-
ted that even plurality electoral law ena-
bles representation of small parties in the 
parliament if they have regional strong-
holds. Parties that have disproportion-
ally weak performance are usually na-
tional parties, with the exception of two 
strongest parties. The prime example of 
12 For the origin of the Israeli electoral system, 
see Rahat, 2005; for consequences of this sys-
tem, see Hazan, 2005.
13 Croatia has a similar electoral system for lo-
cal elections.
a party which is disadvantaged by plu-
rality electoral law is Liberal Democrat 
Party in the United Kingdom.14 So, plu-
rality electoral law virtually eliminates 
small national parties without region-
al strongholds. However, as mentioned 
above (see page 75), plurality electoral 
law usually produces a stable one-party 
government. So, is it possible to have the 
PR system and the prevalence of a sta-
ble one-party government? Here, the an-
swer is negative. The very essence of the 
PR system is fair representation. So, on 
the basis of the PR electoral system, no 
party has the majority in the parliament 
without getting close to 50% of votes. 
Therefore, it is not possible to have ALL 
the best elements from both electoral 
systems. More precisely, it is not possi-
ble to have – on the basis of an artificial 
majority – a stable one-party govern-
ment and a fair distribution of seats at 
the same time. Similarly, it is not possi-
ble to have proportional distribution of 
seats and to eliminate all small parties. 
In other words, in this respect, it is not 
possible to eat a cake and have one.
Since the PR system may allow do-
zens of parties to have their representa-
tives in the parliament (see page 75-76) 
and since such a situation may cause 
very instable government, all countries 
with the PR system have certain instru-
ments that reduce the number of par-
ties. Even the Netherlands, the country 
with the most proportional electoral sys-
tem15 – because of a nationwide district 
and almost full proportionality – still 
has a 0.67 percent threshold. Numerous 
14 For example, in the 1992 elections this party 
received 17.8% of votes, but just 3.1% of seats 
(Farell, 2001: 27). 

























devices may boost the representation 
of largest parties in the PR system. The 
most effective are: threshold, small dis-
trict magnitude, and D’Hondt electoral 
formula. However, these devices also de-
crease the degree of proportionality and 
tend to eliminate small parties. So, can 
the MMP system contribute to the sta-
bility of government keeping fairness in 
the distribution of seats?
Brams and Fishburn (1984) pro-
posed such an electoral system.16 The au-
thors’ proposal has three main features: 
1. The number of seats for each par-
ty would be determined by the sum of 
votes for all party candidates in SMD.
2. The legislature would consist of all 
representatives who win in the districts 
plus largest vote-getters among the lo-
sers, necessary to achieve PR.
3. The size of the legislature would be 
variable, with a lower bound equal to the 
number of districts (if no adjustment is 
necessary to achieve PR) and an upper 
bound equal to twice the number of dis-
tricts.
The most important for this discus-
sion is the fourth main provision:
4. The addition of extra seats can ne-
ver make the minority’s proportion in the 
legislature to exceed its proportion in the 
electorate.
However, it is questionable how to 
decide who won the majority? Usually, 
the party that receives the most votes 
also wins the most seats. However, some-
times the second largest party, in terms 
of votes, wins the most SMD (for exam-
ple, in Britain in 1974 and in New Zea-
land in 1978 and 1981; see Lijphart and 
Grofman, 1984: 11). Furthermore, small 
16 This system has already been used in Puerto 
Rico (Still, 1984).
regional parties may have an even bet-
ter ratio between votes and seats in SMD 
than the winner of the elections. So, how 
to decide on who the winner is? This ar-
ticle has already proposed an electoral 
system which combines the MMP elec-
toral system with the direct election of 
prime minister/governor/mayor. There-
fore, Brams and Fishburn’s (1984) pro-
posal can be adjusted in the following 
way: no one party/coalition may have a 
better ratio between percentage of votes 
and percentage of seats than the par-
ty that wins the race for prime minis-
ter/governor/mayor. The only exception 
would be when a party receives majority 
in more SMD than according to the ratio 
between votes and seats. In order to cla-
rify this provision, a proposal for an elec-
toral law will now be formulated. 
6. Proposed Electoral System 
1. Voters vote directly for prime mini-
ster/governor/mayor. If a candidate 
gets more than 50% of votes, he/she 
is elected.
2. If no candidate receives more than 
50% in the first round of voting, there 
is a run-off between the top two can-
didates, and the winner of the run-
-off is elected prime minister/gover-
nor/mayor. 
3. Voters vote in SMD for members 
of the parliament (local assembly). 
Candidates who get more than 50% 
of votes in SMD are elected.
4. All the candidates from the same 
party as elected prime minister/go-
vernor/mayor (MGM) who receive 
plurality of votes in SMD are also 
elected.
5. Votes in all SMD for candidates from 
the same party as elected MGM 





















number of seats that this party won 
in SMD (on the basis of both plurali-
ty and majority of votes). On the ba-
sis of this calculation, a ratio between 
votes and mandates is calculated.17
6. The number of votes for other par-
ties is calculated (sum of all the votes 
for candidates in SMD). Then, the 
number of votes is divided by the 
above-mentioned ratio in order to 
calculate the number of seats one 
party deserves, with the provision 
that no one party/coalition may have 
a better ratio between percentage of 
votes and percentage of seats than 
the party that won the race for chief 
of the executive.18 19
7. If one party wins more SMD by ma-
jority of votes then this party de-
serves seats (on the basis of overall 
votes), the party keeps extra seats. 
8. When the number of seats for each 
party is calculated, the distribution 
of seats follows the following order:
17 For example, if candidates from the party 
that won the election for chief of the exe-
cutive received, altogether, 400,000 votes and 
40 seats in SMD, the ratio is 10,000 votes for 
one seat. 
18 For example, if one party receives 53,000 
votes, this party is entitled to 5 seats in 
the parliament or local assembly (see note 
above). 
19 Theoretically, it is possible that no one can-
didate from the party that won the election 
for chief of the executive wins the plurality in 
SMD. In this case, the most logical solution is 
that the ratio between votes and seats is de-
cided on the basis of the result of the party 
that wins the most SMD. However, even in 
this case the party that won the election for 
chief of the executive should have the best 
ratio between votes and seats, getting extra 
seats in the distribution of mandates for “best 
losers”. 
a) Candidates that win SMD by majo-
rity of votes;
b) Candidates that win SMD by plura-
lity of votes (if not all of them can get 
a seat then those candidates who re-
ceive most votes are elected);
c) Losers in SMD who receive most 
votes.20
7. Advantages and Disadvantages 
of the Proposed Electoral System
The proposed electoral system would 
have the following attributes:
1. Voters would be able to elect directly 
the chief of the executive branch.21
2. Voters would be able to elect directly 
members of the legislative branch.
3. Voters would be able to vote for can-
didates rather than for parties.
4. Since all candidates would be elected 
in SMD, the system would enable a 
close connection between voters and 
their representatives. 
5. The electoral system would assure 
representation of local interest and 
fair regional distribution of repre-
sentatives.
6. Consequently, the system would 
eliminate unpopular politicians no 
matter which party they belong to. 
Similarly, it would promote party 
members who are popular among 
voters, which means that the elector-
al system would promote intraparty 
democracy. Furthermore, all SMD 
20 Concerning the overall number of seats in 
legislature, see Brams and Fishburn’s (1984) 
proposal.
21 Direct election of the chief of the executive in-
creases the legitimacy of this institution. For a 
discussion on advantages of presidentialism 
























would be important – even those 
in which it is very difficult to win – 
because the number of seats would 
depend on the sum of votes in all 
SMD.
7. The system would enable a fair dis-
tribution of seats, in accordance with 
the percentage of votes for each par-
ty.
8. Independent candidates would have 
a chance to run for the parliament if 
able to win majority in their electoral 
districts.
9. Minorities would have chances to be 
represented because this system ei-
ther does not demand a threshold or 
the threshold can be very low.
10. Since voters would choose the chief 
of the executive, it would be rela-
tively easy to form a government be-
cause the position of prime minis-
ter would not depend on bargaining 
among parties (this usually happens 
in countries with the PR electoral 
system).
11. Since no one party may get a better 
ratio between votes and mandates 
than the party that wins the election 
for chief of the executive,22 the sys-
tem would enable a higher level of 
stability of government than other 
PR systems. 
12. The system would stimulate a high 
electoral turnout, because SMD 
with high turnout would have bet-
ter chances of having more than one 
representative.
13. Voters would be able to show their 
real preferences without fearing to 
lose their votes (as it is the case in the 
22 Except in the case where one party receives 
extra mandates as a result of majority in 
SMD (see previous section).
plurality electoral system). In other 
words, the system would eliminate 
the need for strategic voting.
However, the system would also have 
some disadvantages. Firstly, if members 
of the parliament were unable to vote 
on confidence in the government (in 
the case of the presidential system), the 
parliament would have limited chanc-
es to control the government. In con-
trast, if the parliament were able to vote 
on confidence,23 the government may 
have problems with stability (as in oth-
er countries with the PR electoral sys-
tem). However, as mentioned above, 
the system would enable a higher level 
of stability than other PR systems be-
cause of the provision that no one par-
ty may have a better ratio between votes 
and seats in the parliament than the par-
ty of the elected chief of the executive. 
Furthermore, it would be possible to in-
crease stability by provision that the vote 
of no-confidence cannot be held at least 
a year after the elections. Such a provi-
sion is logical, because there is no reason 
to allow the parliament to challenge the 
voters’ decision immediately after the 
elections, and elected officials should 
have time to show their qualities in of-
fice. In addition, same sort of qualified 
majority (for example, the majority of all 
members of the parliament should vote 
against prime minister or mayor in or-
der to remove him/her from office) may 
also increase stability. In addition, stabi-
lity can also be upheld by removing the 
possibility that the chief of the executive 
may dissolve the parliament before the 
23 In Israel, from 1992-1999, the parliament was 
able to vote on confidence for the prime mini-
ster in spite of the fact that the prime mini-






















end of the mandate (as it was the case 
in Israel). Finally, a modest level of in-
stability can be an advantage because it 
stimulates the chief of the executive to 
cooperate with the parliament and ena-
bles control of the former.
Secondly, an additional disadvan-
tage may be the fact that a winner in 
SMD (by plurality of votes) may not be 
elected, while a loser in SMD may be 
elected. However, such a provision al-
ready exists in countries with majori-
tarian electoral systems (where win-
ners from the first round are not always 
elected), and it is a trade-off for a much 
more important advantage – fairness in 
the distribution of seats. Furthermore, it 
can be expected that very few winners 
in SMD would fail to be elected. Finally, 
the very fact that a candidate did not get 
the majority of votes shows that it is not 
unfair if he/she does not get a seat in the 
parliament. 
Thirdly, it can also be argued that the 
proposed system is complicated. How-
ever, the system would not be compli-
cated for voters at all. They should just 
select a candidate for the parliament and 
a candidate for the executive they favor 
most. Furthermore, electoral commis-
sions would also have no problem with 
“deciphering” who won mandates. 
Finally, the system would not allow 
full proportionality (as a matter of fact, 
no system enables full proportionality). 
However, this system would be very pro-
portional (and fair), with a higher level 
of stability than similar PR systems. 
To conclude, the MMP electoral 
system which would combine the im-
proved German electoral system with 
the former Israeli electoral system (from 
1992-1999) would offer the best of both 
worlds – direct accountability of MPs to 
their districts and diverse partisan prefe-
rences.24 Of course, this system would 
not eliminate all disadvantages of PR and 
pluralitarian systems, but it would elimi-
nate most of them. In short, to repeat the 
mantra of this paper, the proposed elec-
toral system would enable eating the en-
tire cake and keeping a three-quarter of 
it. However, only a practical implemen-
tation of this system would make possi-
ble a real test of its advantages and dis-
advantages.
24 The proposed electoral system also includes 
some advantages of the majoritarian sys-
tem (see pp. 86-87). Furthermore, there are 
some similarities between the proposed sys-
tem and the single transferable vote elector-
al system because votes for candidates that 
are not elected are transferred to other can-
didates from the same party. In other words, 
the proposed electoral system incorporates 
attributes of all existing electoral systems. Of 
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Imati ovce i sačuvati najveći dio novca:
mogu li se imati glavne prednosti 
dvaju izbornih sistema?
SAŽETAK  Članak istražuje je li moguće kombinirati prednosti proporcionalnog i većinskog 
izbornog sistema. Analizira postojeće mješovite izborne sisteme i sugerira moguća po-
boljšanja istih. Glavni je zaključak da nije moguće eliminirati sve mane proporcionalnog i 
većinskog izbornog sistema ali je moguće, barem teorijski, eliminirati većinu mana kom-
biniranjem glavnih prednosti ta dva izborna modela. Zbog toga članak, u završnom dijelu, 
predlaže poboljšani model mješovitog izbornog sistema koji bi omogućio da se “ima ovce 
ali i sačuva najveći dio novca”. 
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